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We compare the seller’s expected revenue in a second price sealed bid auction for a single object
in which bidders receive multidimensional signals. Bidders’ valuations for the object depend on
their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in various examples that the
seller can be better oﬀ not revealing publicly his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not
necessarily hold when bidders receive multidimensional signals.
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The “linkage principle” is a very important result of auction theory. An implication of the linkage
principle is that a seller maximizes his expected revenue by publicly revealing his information
regarding the value of the object for the bidders. This result has been established by Milgrom
and Weber (1982).1 It holds true in single-unit auctions, with symmetric bidders, when bidders’
valuations are aﬃliated. Recently Perry and Reny (1999) have shown, by way of a counter-
example, that this is not necessarily true in multi-unit auctions. Building on this counter-example,
Krishna (2002) shows that the release of public information may generate a decrease in seller’s
revenue when bidders are asymmetric in a single-unit auction.2 In this paper, we complement
these negative ﬁndings regarding the linkage principle. We show that the linkage principle can
fail in a single unit auction when bidders are symmetric but receive multidimensional signals.
We establish this result by considering “blind auctions”. A blind auction is an auction in
which bidders do not know the object which is auctioned. However they know that the object is
of one among m possible types and they know their private valuation for each type. The seller
knows the type of the object but does not observe bidders’ valuations. A bidder’s value for the
object is therefore determined by m (real value) signals (his private valuation for each type) and
the signal possessed by the seller. The main diﬀerence with the standard independent private
value framework is the fact that each bidder has multiple signals.
We compare the seller’s expected revenue when he runs a blind auction and when he publicly
releases perfect information on the type of the object. In either format, the seller uses a sealed
bid second price auction. We show that when there are two bidders the seller’s expected revenue
is always strictly larger in the blind auction, i.e. when he does not publicly reveal the type of
the object. Moreover, using various examples, we show that the seller’s expected revenue can
also be strictly larger in the blind auction when the number of bidders is larger than 2. As we
do not depart from the independent private value framework, the revenue equivalence theorem
1See Krishna (2002), Chapter 7 for an exposition of the linkage principle.
2A related paper is Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003). They consider an optimal auction design problem in
which the seller can also choose the information structure of each bidder. They show that optimal information
structures are “partitional” and thus leaves some uncertainty on their valuations to the bidders. The linkage
principle does not apply in their setting because information is not released publicly and is unknown to the seller
(i.e. remains private to each bidder). Finally, they do not consider the case in which bidders receive multi-
dimensional signals
1applies and our results extends to the ﬁrst price auction and to other commonly used auction
mechanisms.
Interestingly blind auctions are actually used in ﬁnancial markets. Increasingly portfolio
managers auction packages of trades to brokers. Brokers announce a trading fee per share at
which they commit to execute each stock in the package at its closing price on the day preceding
the auction.3 The broker announcing the lowest fee wins the auction and will be in charge of
executing all the trades in the package (see Kavajecz and Keim (2002) for a detailed description
of these auctions). The winning broker makes a proﬁt if he achieves lower transaction costs than
his fee.4 This can be done by clearing many of the orders in the package against his own book of
pending transactions.5 A key feature of these auctions is that portfolio managers do not reveal
the identity of the securities in the package and the number of shares to buy or sell for each
security. Hence brokers (i.e., bidders) face some uncertainty regarding the “object” (a package
of trades) which is auctioned.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows that it can
be optimal for a seller to conduct a blind auction. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
A seller wishes to sell one object. There are n risk neutral bidders. The seller and each bidder
receive real value private signals regarding the value of the object. The seller receives signal




where the components X
j
i are identically and independently distributed over [0,1].W e d e n o t e
by F(.) the cumulative distribution of signal X
j
i and by f(.) its density. Bidders’ signals Xi are
i.i.d. and they are independently distributed from S. Each bidder and the seller observes his
own signal, but not the signals received by the other agents. We denote by Vi = u(Xi,S) the
3Hence each broker commits to sell (buy) the stocks in the package at a ﬁxed price plus a markup (resp. minus
ad i s c o u n t )w h i c hi st h et r a d i n gf e ep e rs h a r e .
4The transaction cost on a speciﬁct r a d ei st h ed i ﬀerence between the average price at which the broker executes
the trade and the guaranteed price.
5Since each broker has a diﬀerent book of pending transactions, it is not unreasonable to view the brokers as
having diﬀerent private values for each possible composition of the package.







where (xi,s) is a given realization of (Xi,S) and 1{s=j} takes the value 1 if s = j and 0 otherwise.
Notice that a bidder’s valuation does not depend on the other bidders’ valuations and that u(.,.)
is identical for all bidders. Hence bidders have private valuations and are symmetric. Finally we
note that all signals are aﬃliated.6
One interpretation for traders’ valuation is as follows. The object sold by the seller has m
possible types (for instance, the object has m possible diﬀerent colors). Type j is obtained with
probability πj. Bidders have private valuations for the object that depend on its type.
The seller organizes a second price sealed bid auction. Each bidder submits a sealed bid. The
bidder who submits the highest bid receives the object and he pays the seller the second highest
bid. The seller can decide (before receiving his signal) to publicly and perfectly reveal his signal
or not before running the auction. We assume that the seller can credibly commit to a disclosure
policy.7 If the seller does not disclose his signal, we say he runs a blind auction since in this case
bidders do not know exactly the type of the object.




the seller reveals his signal, then bidder i’s valuation will be vi = u(xi,s)=xs
i,w h e r e a si ft h e




i. Observe that bidders’ valuations are independent whether the type of the object is
known or not. Thus, as is well-known, each bidder has a weakly dominant bidding strategy which
consists in bidding his valuation for the object.
In the rest of the paper, we study the seller’s expected revenue in each possible format for
the auction.
6For all i,j, signals S,a n dX
j
i ,a r ea ﬃliated as independence is a special case of aﬃliation. Moreover, let h
be the joint distribution of Vi and S.T h e n w e h a v e h(vi,s)=f(vi)πs. Thus, for any v,v






0,s). Therefore Vi and S are aﬃliated.
7This is not important when traders’ valuations are given by Eq.(1). In this case, once the seller opts for
disclosure, it is weakly dominant for him to truthfully reveal his information since signals X
j
i are i.i.d for a given i.
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3.1 Two bidders
If the seller reveals his signal s, then the winner of the object is the bidder with the highest xs
i
and he pays the second highest valuation among the n bidders conditional on the type of the
object being s.L e tXs
(2) be the second highest element of {Xs
1,Xs
2,...,Xs
n}. By assumption, all
the signals X
j
i are i.i.d. for all i,j.I tf o l l o w st h a tt h eXs
(2) are i.i.d. for all s ∈ {1,2,...,m} with
cumulative distribution
F(2)(z)=F(z)n + nF(z)n−1(1 − F(z)).




























i. The winner of the object is the bidder with the highest expected valuation for
the object and he pays the second highest expected valuation among the n bidders. Let G be the




i .A st h eWi are i.i.d., the seller’s expected revenue




((n − 1)G(z)n − nG(z)n−1)dz. (3)
Proposition 1 :I fn =2then the seller’s expected revenue is larger in the blind auction, i.e.
RD <R ND.
Proof:F o rn =2 ,w eh a v eRD <R ND iﬀ
Z 1
0
F(z)2 − 2F(z)dz <
Z 1
0
G(z)2 − 2G(z)dz (4)
4As the random variables X
j











0 zf(z)dz where g(.)
def





0 G(z)dz. Hence Condition (4) rewrites
Z 1
0
(F(z)2 − G(z)2)dz < 0. (5)
Observe that the random variable Wi is a weighted average of m i.i.d. random variables
with cumulative distribution F(.).T h u sG second order stochastically dominates F.8 Hence the
following inequality holds true:
Z x
0
(F(z) − G(z))dz ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1],




0 (F(y) − G(y))dy. The function θ(.)
has the following properties: (i) θ0(z)=F(z) − G(z);( i i )θ(z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ [0,1]; (iii) θ(z) > 0




0 G(y)dy.T h u s ,
Z 1
0














3.2 More than 2 bidders
The previous proposition shows that when there are 2 bidders, the seller is always strictly better
oﬀ not disclosing his information on the type of the object. Thus the linkage principle does
not necessarily hold true in our framework. Now we show, using 2 numerical examples, that this
conclusion also holds true when there are several bidders. In each example we assume that m =2
and π1 = π2 =1 /2.T h u s Wi = 1
2(X1
i + X2
i ). The cumulative probability distribution of the
signals, F(.),i sd i ﬀerent in each example.
Example 1. Assume that X
j
i can take two values, say 0 and 1 with probability (1 − p) and
p. Consider the case in which the seller discloses his signal. The price paid by the winner of




i } ∈ [0,1]









i), with strict inequality if x
j









i )].T h a t i s E[U(Wi)] >E [U(X
j
i )].T h i s m e a n s t h a t G(.) second order stochastically dominates
F(.).
5the auction is 1 iﬀ at least 2 buyers bid 1 for the object (in which case, the object is randomly
assigned to one of the 2 buyers). This occurs iﬀ at least two among the n bidders have a valuation
equal to 1 . Otherwise the price paid by the winner of the auction is zero. Hence the seller’s
expected revenue is
RD =P r ( Xs
(2) ≥ 1) = 1 − (1 − p)n−1(1 + (n − 1)p).
Now consider the case in which the seller does not disclose his signal. In this case, the
probability distribution of each bidder’s valuation (Wi)i s :

   
   
Pr(Wi =0 )=( 1− p)2
Pr(Wi = 1
2)=2 p(1 − p)
Pr(Wi =1 )=p2
We deduce that the cumulative distribution of the second highest valuation among the n bidders
is 
   
   
Pr(W(2) ≤ 0) = (1 − p)2(n−1)(n +( 1− n)(1 − p)2),
Pr(W(2) ≤ 0.5) = (1 − p2)n−1(1 + p2(n − 1)),
Pr(W(2) ≤ 1) = 1.
The price paid in the auction is equal to the second highest valuation among the n bidders. Thus,
the seller’s expected revenue if he does not disclose his information is




(1 − p)2(n−1)((n − 1)p(p − 2) − 1) −
1
2
(1 − p2)n−1(1 + (n − 1)p2).
The next table indicates for various pairs (p,n) whether the seller is better oﬀ disclosing (the cell
contains a “D”) or not (“ND”).
p/n 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 12 15 20 25 30
0.5 ND D D D D D D D D D D D
0.4 ND ND D D D D D D D D D D
0.3 ND ND ND D D D D D D D D D
0.2 ND ND ND ND ND D D D D D D D
0.1 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND D D D D
Table 1
6Example 2. In our second example, the bidders’ signals are drawn from a continuous dis-
tribution. Speciﬁcally, we assume that X
j
i is continuously distributed on [0,1] with a cumulative
probability distribution:
F(z)=
z + αlog(1 + z)
1+αlog(1 + z)
(6)
with α ≥ 0.N o t i c et h a tF(z) increases with α.9 This means that the larger is α,t h el a r g e ri st h e
probability that bidders have small valuations. In this sense, increasing α is similar to decreasing
p in the previous example. The cumulative probability distribution for a bidder’s valuation if the





Using Equations (2) and (3) in the previous subsection, we compute numerically RD and RND
for various pairs (α,n). Table 2 indicates for which pairs (α,n), the seller is better oﬀ disclosing
(the cell contains a “D”) or not (“ND”).
α\n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 ND ND D D D D D D D
4 ND ND ND D D D D D D
10 ND ND ND D D D D D D
40 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND D D
Table 2
Summary. In these 2 examples, the seller is better oﬀ with the blind auction if the number
of bidders is small and/or the probability of observing X
j
i close to zero is suﬃciently large (p
small/α large). Thus the linkage principle does not necessarily hold in our set-up, even if the
number of bidders is relatively large.
3.3 A last example
Our model diﬀers from the standard framework in auction theory (i.e. Milgrom and Weber
(1982)) for two reasons: (A) each bidder has a multidimensional signal and (B) the relationship
between a bidder’s valuation and the seller’s signal is not continuous or monotonic. The reader
9 Indeed ∂F/∂α =
(1−z)l o g( 1 + z)
(1+α log(1+z))2 that is strictly positive for z ∈ (0,1).
7may wonder whether (A) or/and (B) are the reasons for which the linkage principle fails in our
model. In order to address this issue, we have considered a slightly diﬀerent framework in which




where Xi =( X1
i ,X2
i ) is the signal observed by bidder i and S is the signal observed by the seller.
F u r t h e r m o r ew ea s s u m et h a t( i )X
j
i are i.i.d. variables on [0,1] with cumulative distribution F(.)
deﬁn e db yE q u a t i o n( 6 )a n dt h a t( i i )S is independently distributed from bidders’ signals and
uniformly distributed on [1/2,1]. In this framework all hypotheses of Milgrom and Weber (1982)
are satisﬁed with the exception that bidders receive a bi-dimensional signal. In particular, u(.,.)
is continuous and increasing in X1
i ,X2
i and S.
For any given s ∈ [1/2,1], the random variable U = X1 + sX2 has distribution
H(z,s)
def
=P r ( U<z )=
Z 1
0
F(z − sx2)f(x2)dx2 ∀z ∈ [0,1+s].
If the seller discloses s then bidder i ’s valuation is wi(s)=x1
i + sx2
i and the cumulative
probability distribution of bidders’ valuations is H(z,s). Following the same reasoning as in




(n − 1)H(z,s)n − nH(z,s)n−1dz.
Hence the seller’s expected revenue (ex-ante) is:






(n − 1)H(z,s)n − nH(z,s)n−1dzds.
If the seller does not disclose his signal then bidder i ’s expected valuation is wi = x1
i +E[S]x2
i.
Hence the cumulative probability distribution of bidders’ valuations is H(z,E[S]). We deduce




(n − 1)H(z,E[S])n − nH(z,E[S])n−1dz = RD(E[S])
In order to understand whether it is optimal for the seller to disclose ore not S, we compute
numerically RND and RD, as we did in Example 2.
8α\n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ... 14 15
2 ND ND ND D D D D D D D
4 ND ND ND ND D D D D D D
10 ND ND ND ND ND ND D D D D
30 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND D
Table 3
We conclude that the linkage principle does not necessarily apply when bidders have multi-
dimensional signals. Notice that as in Examples 1 and 2, the seller is better oﬀ not disclosing
information when the number of bidders is small and/or the probability of observing X
j
i close to
zero is suﬃciently large.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We conclude by providing the economic intuition for our ﬁndings. If the seller reveals the type of
the object, then only the bidders who have a high valuation for this speciﬁc type will aggressively
compete for the object. In contrast, if the seller does not reveal the type of the object, then the
most aggressive bidders will be those who have high valuation for some among the m possible
types of the object. Thus, by keeping secret the type of the object, the seller increases the number
of bidders who have large valuations. This eﬀect explains why concealing information can raise
the seller’s expected revenue. On the other hand, if the seller does not disclose information, a
bidder’s oﬀer is given by the average of his signals. Hence it is smaller than the highest of his
signals. This eﬀect works to decrease the seller’s expected revenue and explains why the seller
may be better oﬀ revealing information.
The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second when, for each object, there is a large probability that
the bidders have a small valuation and/or when the number of bidders is small. As this number
enlarges, the ﬁrst eﬀect becomes less important since, for each object, the probability of having
at least 2 bidders with large valuations becomes larger. For a suﬃciently large number of bidders,
the seller is then better oﬀ disclosing information.
It is worth stressing that our ﬁndings do not depend on the fact that we focus on a second
price sealed bid auction. For a given disclosure policy, the revenue-equivalence theorem holds
9true in our model (bidders have independent private values for the object). Thus, the ranking of
the seller’s expected revenue across disclosure regimes extends to the other auction mechanisms
that guarantee that the winner is the seller with the highest valuation10 and that the seller with
the lowest possible valuation has an expected payoﬀ equal to zero.
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